Aspect Analysis: Manchester City’s left wing dynamics vs Manchester United
The Manchester Derby: It was a very important game for both clubs. Manchester City, sitting on top of the table, had to win the game, to keep the distance to Liverpool. For Manchester United, a win was necessary, to keep track with Arsenal for the top four fight.
In the end, Manchester City easily won the game 4-1, by two goals both from De Bruyne and Mahrez. A major aspect of Manchester City’s offensive game was the left-hand side. The Citizens were constantly able to break through there and create chances.
In the last couple of games, Manchester City used a different structure in possession as in most games.
But let’s take a look back. Earlier, Pep Guardiola’s team played with a 2-3-5 in possession, using wide wingers, inverted fullbacks and high 8s. A chance creation method that Manchester City often used were vertical runs from the 8s in the half-spaces. The midfielders often tried to exploit the space in between a fullback and centre back.
Fictional example: The inverted fullback passes to the wide winger. The wide position drags the opposition fullback wide, opening up space. The left 8 is positioned high and makes a vertical run in the space between fullback and centre back. Also important is that the striker pins both centre backs. The winger then plays into the path of the 8 and Manchester City can progress through.
This approach matched very well with the qualities of each player. Though, more and more teams found ways to defend it. For example, by closing down the centre and forcing City wide.
But Pep Guardiola found a solution. His newest update is an asymmetric structure, which he already used a few times. However, against Manchester United, it was match-deciding. According to whoscored.com, 50% of the Citizens attacks came from the left side.
Their newest structure only changed slightly. Pep Guardiola only introduced a new positioning on the left side, including the left fullback, the left winger and the left 8. Against Manchester United, Cancelo, Grealish and Bernardo Silva were used in these positions.
The new structure contained Cancelo moving higher in the left-wing zone, Grealish inverting and Silva inverting even more and often dropping deeper.
Manchester United defended in a 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 mid-block, using narrow wingers (Elanga and Sancho). The central midfielders (McTominay and Fred) controlled the centre and constantly shifted over to use their cover-shadow for Manchester City’s 8s. Up front, Pogba and Fernandes looked to cut the passing lane into Rodri but could also press Manchester City’s centre backs at times. Basically, the aim from Manchester United was to close the centre and force Manchester City wide.
Manchester City’s offensive structure against Manchester United’s 4-4-2/4-2-2-2. Cancelo moved higher up, occupying the wing. Grealish inverted (at times into the half-space). Silva inverted even more and dropped deeper.
So how did Manchester City’s new approach beat Manchester United?
First of all, the offensive structure combined with Manchester United’s approach allowed Cancelo to receive out wide. As Grealish inverted, he dragged the right fullback (Wan-Bissaka) inside. Moreover, as the right winger (Elanga) usually looked to close down the half-space, Cancelo was free out wide. Elanga was constantly focused on cutting off passing lanes in the half-space and never really watched the movements of Cancelo. This allowed the Portuguese to move up without Elanga noticing it (blind-side).
Grealish’ inverted position drags Wan-Bissaka inwards. Cancelo can move up as Elanga covered the half-space. The Portuguese receives with time and space out wide.
From there, Manchester United often didn’t know how to react. No one was tasked to step out, after Elanga was easily outplayed. This either gave Cancelo space to cross or opened space for other players when a Manchester United player moved out and left his initial opponent free.
Secondly, Grealish could also be free in the half-space. Manchester United’s right central midfielder (McTominay) usually stayed in front of Silva and looked to mark him, using his cover-shadow. Within this positioning, Wan-Bissaka was constantly overloaded. He often had to look for Grealish, Silva and/or Cancelo, meaning one of them would be free. Grealish was often accessible as Silva was behind McTominay. But if Wan-Bissaka would move out to Grealish, space between him and Lindelöf would enlarge for a run from Silva.
Wan-Bissaka is overloaded and doesn’t know who to mark. If he marks Grealish, enormous space wide for Cancelo would be created. Instead, if he would mark Cancelo, Grealish or Silva could make runs in the space between the fullback and centre back. In this instance, Wan-Bissaka basically just stays at his position, meaning Grealish can receive with time and space, after he dropped deep. He decides to switch the point of attack. Moreover, the positioning of the striker is important as he pins the centre backs.
Again, this posed troubles for Manchester United as they didn’t know how to react with the free man. Moreover, from there, Manchester City could progress through, cross inside or switch the play to the underloaded side for a potential 1v1 duel.
Thirdly, Manchester City still used their standard structure and chance creation method at times. Though, with Cancelo constantly staying wide instead of inverting. Since McTominay didn’t track Silva man-oriented, the Portuguese could exploit the space between Wan-Bissaka and Lindelöf with a vertical run.
Standard chance creation method with Cancelo wide. Grealish receives wide. Silva dynamically occupies the space between the fullback and centre back with a vertical run. He receives and Manchester City is in behind.
Lastly, the structure on the left-hand side allowed Manchester City a better counterpressing. The players were constantly in close distances and therefore able to immediately put Manchester United under pressure after a ball loss. But this wasn’t the only thing that was important for their counterpressing.
Rodri always moved over to provide cover and support. Furthermore, the left sided centre back (Laporte) also stepped up aggressively, to enable a better counterpressing.
After winning the ball back on such a high position, Manchester City directly looked to get to the goal. Their distances to each other and overload helped them to bypass Manchester United.
Most of these methods mentioned above were included in their first two goals:
The first goal came from their standard structure on the left, but with Cancelo wide. Their structure allowed them to progress through, cross inside and eventually score.
Laporte has the ball. Cancelo is positioned wide. The Portuguese can receive out wide as Elange firstly stays narrow. The winger is now too late to disturb Cancelo. As soon as the pass was played wide, Silva moved forward on the blind-side of McTominay and Elanga. As Cancelo has just enough time, he can pick a pass to Silva.
For their second goal, Manchester City again tried to progress through the left-hand side. Although, Manchester United were able to stop them. However, Manchester City’s amazing structure enabled a great counterpressing to win the ball back. The close distances and overload allowed the Citizens to progress through and later score the goal.
Manchester United won the ball on their right-hand side. Pogba has the ball. He is already under pressure and plays to Elanga. The winger is also under pressure and makes a bad pass, which Manchester City intercepts. Look at the close distances from Manchester City. Laporte aggressively moved up and Rodri moved over, to create an overload and control the space around the ball.
Both goals didn’t just come from their structure, though, it was a major factor.
CONCLUSION
Lastly, Manchester City deservingly won 4-1. The left-wing dynamics were outstanding. Pep Guardiola always finds new methods and strategies to beat the opponent. It will be interesting to see, the further developments of this squad and how opponents try to encounter their new structure.
written by @Chris17_t
