Tactical analysis: Chelsea vs Manchester City
A fictional scene.
"T… Thom… As… Thomas!"
His heart kicked against his rib cage, like a "wild" bird locked in a cage for the first time. It wants to get out. His forehead beaded with perspiration. His eyes were as red as a bowl of meshed papers. It was the same nightmare. The three consecutive defeats. The Uefa Champions League final. The same man.
He laid there, on his bed, as the ticking of the clock irregularly dispersed unwanted modifications (noise) disruptive to the quiet. What felt like hours passed.
"Tomorrow," he muttered sleepily to himself, then he reached for the lamp next to his bedpost and turned it off. "Sic Semper Tyrannis." A smile flickered across his face in the darkness.
Data
Manchester City aimed to suffocate Chelsea's build-up play. They launched a high press to achieve this objective - it was aggressive in the manner in which it was coordinated, and it was effective, too, which is shown in their Passes Per Defensive Action (PPDA) of 9.13. As a result, Chelsea completed a trifling amount of their passes in the opposition half: 82 out of 341 passes. Put differently, only 24% of their successful passes were made in City's half; contrariwise, City executed 84 passes in Chelsea's half (53% of their passes), 25 more than Chelsea did in their own half (259). But there's a confounding factor to be considered: City, in general, tend to play more passes than Chelsea; they're the quintessential possession-based team, whereas Chelsea aren't averse to centre their offensive game around transitions.
Even then, Chelsea's numbers reflect a suboptimal performance on their part. It must be admitted, however, that the intensity of City's high block wasn't sustainable - they're mere mortals - over the course of the game. After some time, City had to relax their pressure, to cope with their reduced energy levels but nevertheless, they graded out more "pressures" in the attacking third (69) than they did in the midfield (68) and defensive third (26).
The converse is true for Chelsea, most of their pressures were applied in their defensive third (75), followed by the midfield third (70), and then the attacking third where the number of pressures was considerably fewer (36). It had as much to do with their resistance to employing a high block as their inability to implement it against City, who is arguably the most drilled team in that phase of the game, and in all fairness, it wasn't the game plan at Porto. Although they won the duels count (50-46), the numbers are trivial, when they are contextualized.
In terms of Expected Goals, Chelsea only managed 0.3 xG, befitting the consensus of opinions on the visual understanding of the game. Of the five shots they registered, four of them were blocked, with the exception of Marcos Alonso's attempt from the halfway line at the 89 minute. Manchester City, on the other hand, accumulated an xG of 1.7, from 15 attempts on goal. It's not an inordinate amount of high-value chances, their xG/shot stands at 0.11, but in comparison to that of Chelsea, the gap is significant.
Chelsea's underwhelming output in key attacking metrics such as xG and shots volume indicates that City were solid. They limited Chelsea's carries and passes into the attacking third to 6 and 18 respectively while rating 20 and 43 in those statistics. On a goalkeeping level, Edouard Mendy had a PSxG of 1.2. In keeping with the trend, Ederson's was zero.
0 - 15 minutes (the period in which game state is less influenceable)
Manchester City's high block (4-2-3-1) versus Chelsea's 5-2 build-up structure. (The left wing-back is out of view, as he provided maximum width)
City identified the first pass and Christensen's body orientation (he faced sideward) as pressing triggers, and therefore, acted on them, with Foden leading the press. The orchestrators behind him - Grealish, De Bruyne, Cancelo and Jesus - then proceeded to constrict the playing area and hem in Chelsea.
Foden (false nine) pressured Christensen, and while maintaining defensive access to the centre-back, in case the ball was played back to him, he adjusted his own positioning and tried to make himself look big to discourage a switch of play. Grealish (LM) arched his run to guide Azpilicueta (RCB) to their pressing trap, which prompted the left-back Cancelo to provide cover behind him and gain access to James (RB). De Bruyne engaged the "ball-carrier" - it was Kante and Jorginho - in those zones until Jesus merged into the press to eliminate the numerical superiority Chelsea had possessed.
Again, City used the first pass (from Mendy to Rudiger) as a trigger to initiate a high press. Jesus ran towards Rudiger - on a diagonal plane that he may cover shadow Jorginho, at which point Walker (and Silva was on Kovacic to thwart the midfielder's plan to construct a substructure around the ball-carrier) jumped out to press Alonso, forcing the full-back to turn inward. He played a pass to Jorginho, who had left Jesus' cover shadow but was now man-marked by De Bruyne. It was City's tactical objective: lure them into their pressing trap in the half-space.
When Jorginho receives the ball, he is encircled by four City players, who are oriented to block the passing lanes; Walker, in particular, makes a deliberate effort to close off the exit option to Kovacic. This meant that the Chelsea midfielder now had to play the out ball to Alonso, who was left with no choice but to attempt to clip the ball over the press. As seen below, Rodri was there to recycle possession. City's coordinated pressure resulted in the turnover.
City has a tendency to speed up the tempo when the ball enters the final third. In this instance, Cancelo received a pass from Laporte, and James stepped out to press him to deprive him of time and space on the ball. This created a little bit of space outside the block which Grealish sought to attack, with the aim to stretch the Chelsea backline horizontally. In response, Azpilicueta moved wide to protect the space, and instinctively De Bruyne made a run to attack the seam. The pass never occurred due to James' pressure and Cancelo's profile as a player (he's inverted), but these movements allowed Foden to receive the ball in space and thus, facilitating the switch (02:17).
Chelsea's customary 5-3-2 shape in which the defensive midfielders—Jorginho and Kante—work in tandem with the wide centre-backs—Azpilicueta and Rudiger—to defend the right and left half-spaces. One way City tried to break it down was to deploy Jesus to the right-wing where he provided maximum width. The illustration below is not the best example, but his occupation of the furthest right vertical corridor often drew Alonso, and so, Foden made runs across the defence to attack the widened space between Rudiger and the left-back.
De Bruyne is a pressing machine. His pressure on forward-facing Jorginho was such that the midfielder was compelled to turn and play a backwards pass to Christensen (CB). But it wasn't an individual action; he was merely the one that initiated the press. The right-winger Jesus abandoned his nominal position to have defensive access to Kovacic, and consequently diminish the midfielder's serviceability in the situation. Away from the scene, Rodri pushed up to apply immediate pressure on Kante or Alonso were they to beat him to the loose ball.
Rather than playing out from the back, Mendy urged his players to move up the pitch and sent the ball over 40 yards from the goal kick to relieve his team of pressure. It shouldn't be seen as a negative; it's only an indication of how effective City's high block has been in disrupting their build-up play.
Chelsea tried to launch a high press, but Walker bypassed it easily by cutting inside. The reason for this is that Werner's role in its implementation was inadequate. Initially, he did well to force CIty backwards, however, he failed to adapt as the situation evolved. When the ball was moved to the right-back position Kovavic would, in theory, have the option to hand over the responsibility of marking the CM (Silva) to him, so he can exert immediate pressure on the ball, but Werner stood outside the 6-yard box until it was too late.
There's not much tactical detail in this snapshot. Mendy caught the cross from the corner kick and City transitioned to defence, but in the process, they became lopsided to the right. Mendy recognized the opportunity that presented itself, Chelsea had a 2v1 numerical advantage with Alonso and Kante in that area and threw the ball to the full-back. However, De Bruyne in anticipation of the development, dashed to bring down Alonso. Had he not dived in for the challenge, the left-back would've played a simple pass to Kante, setting up an attacking transition.
In previous situations, Chelsea would drop off and coalesce into a 5-3-2 medium block. But this time, it was different—they counter pressed and subsequently committed to pressuring City—because Alonso had joined the attack prior to the loss of possession and crucially, their players were connected in a network, which placed them in a good position (numerical parity and defensive access) to deploy a high block.
Chelsea tweaked their buildup. Christensen is better than his counterpart (Rudiger) on the ball, which explains why he received the "first pass" more frequently. Here, he took the ball and faced the right-wing zone, as he had done throughout the game. But, strangely, he veered around and used Mendy as a relay player to shift the ball to the left side. The seemingly inconsequential decision to not play through City's strong side fostered progression. Rudiger received the ball with time and space, and although he couldn't play Jorginho directly, he passed the ball to Kovacic, who did - the passing lane to Jorginho wasn't obstructed. And Chelsea were able to play out from the press.
City clustered around in a sort of 3-4-3 (the numbers aren't of paramount importance). Dias, Laporte and Walker made up the first line. The second line was inhabited by Cancelo, Rodri, Silva and Foden, who dropped deep to form a diamond shape. De Bruyne and Grealish occupied the left half-space, while Jesus provided single width. Normally, as Foden descended to the midfield line, one of Chelsea's centre-backs would follow him, but Christensen couldn't avoid stepping out of his block in this situation, because Grealish pinned him.
Werner's finishing has been questionable for some time now, but the timing of his runs - partly against high lines - is excellent. Azpilicueta hoofed the ball long to Lukaku to escape the pressure, and the striker laid it off to Alonso, then the left-back drove at the Chelsea defence. Werner's movement was precise; he started off in an offside position, but just when Alonso geared up to play the final ball, he made a curving run to come inside. Unfortunately, Alonso didn't strike the ball with sufficient force (and curl), which had a negative effect on the trajectory of Werner's run.
